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The Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) has consistently adopted both an 
export-expansion  policy  and  an  import-substitution  policy  concurrently. 
While the export-expansion policy has been widely scrutinized and generally 
regarded as an important driving force behind Taiwan’s economic success, the 
import-substitution  policy  has received  relatively  little  examination,  espe- 
cially with regard to how it was formulated and its effects on economic devel- 
opment. This paper has the limited purpose of analyzing some asFects of the 
principal instruments of import substitution, namely, tariff policy and import 
controls. 
12.1  Tariff and Nontariff Policies 
12.1.1  Tariff Rates 
Table 12.1 shows both the nominal tariff rates and the “average tariff bur- 
den” in Taiwan. The nominal tariff rate is the average rate of all tariff items in 
the tariff schedule. The average tariff burden is the ratio of total tariff revenue 
to total value of merchandise imports before tariffs and hence does not take 
into account the effect of  prohibitive tariff  rates.  The nominal rates (simple 
average)  remained  around  40  percent  throughout  the  195Os,  196Os,  and 
1970s. In 1974, the average nominal tariff rate reached a high of 55.7 percent. 
Thereafter, it began to decline gradually, reaching 39.1 percent in 1979. 
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Source; Nominal tariff rates are adopted from Mao and Tu  (1991, table 7). Average tariff burden 
and tariff revenue as percentages of total revenue are the authors’ calculations based on Yearbook 
of  Tax Statistics, Republic of  China (various issues). 
It continued to decline after 1980, when the two-column tariff schedule was 
enacted. Column 1 tariffs applied to the countries that did not grant preferen- 
tial tariffs (most-favored nation [MFN] treatment) to the ROC and hence had 
to pay higher tariffs for their commodity exports to Taiwan, while Column I1 
tariffs applied to the countries  that granted a preferential trade status to Tai- 
wan. In practice, except for the  Communist  states, virtually  all free-world 
trade partners were categorized as Column 11 countries. Nevertheless, the av- 
erage nominal tariff rate in that category did not fall below  30 percent until 
after 1985. For Column I countries, the average nominal tariff rate remained 
above  35  percent  before  1985.  Significant  import  liberalization  has taken 
place since 1985, and, consequently, the average nominal tariff rate has been 
substantially reduced. 
A similar pattern of  evolution can be observed for the average tariff burden. 
It was above 12 percent in the 1960s and began to decline in the 1970s. It was 341  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
11.3 percent in 1971 and reached 7.5 percent in 1981. Thereafter, it remained 
at nearly 8 percent until 1986. By  1988, it was down to 5.8 percent. Accord- 
ing to the four-year (1989-92)  tariff reduction plan announced by the govern- 
ment in November 1988, the average tariff burden will be reduced to 3.5 per- 
cent  in  1992,  about  the  same  level  as  the  average  of  the  industrialized 
members of the OECD. The average nominal tariff rate, according to the plan, 
will be reduced to 7 percent by  1992. 
12.1.2  Import Controls 
In Taiwan, direct import controls are as important as tariffs in regulating the 
flow of  trade. Importable commodities may be subject to three types of con- 
trols: (i) commodities that cannot be  imported at all by  private importers; 
(ii)  commodities  that  may  be  imported,  but  under  strict  controls;  and 
(iii) commodities that are imported but where the consent of  certain branches 
of the government is required or restrictions on the qualifications of importers 
or countries of origin may be imposed. Over the years, the number of items 
under the first category (i.e., prohibited) has been reduced from 4.8 percent 
of all importable items in 1956 to 0.03 percent in 1987. The number of items 
under the second category (i.e., controlled) has been reduced from 46 percent 
of all importable commodities in 1956 to 1.6 percent in 1987. The number of 
items under the third category (i.e., restricted) has also been reduced. 
It should be noted that many import restrictions are imposed for reasons of 
national defense, environmental protection, and sanitation and health as well 
as for the protection of  government monopolies and the agricultural sector. 
Restrictions on countries of  origin are designed sometimes to correct trade 
imbalances (e.g., restrictions on imports from Japan, with which Taiwan has 
had large trade deficits) and sometimes to fend off products from competitive 
countries. 
These import controls are regarded by many as more restrictive than high 
tariffs. In the 1950s and 1960s, almost half of importable items were classified 
in prohibited or controlled categories. Dramatic liberalization took place in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Today, less than 2 percent of the importable commodi- 
ties are still prohibited or controlled. But other restrictive measures, such as 
those imposed on the sources of imports and the eligibility of importers, are 
still commonplace. The various branches of  the government whose consent 
for certain imports is necessary are often those whose job it is to protect the 
interests of the import-competing industries. 
12.1.3  Changes in Trade Policy 
The government of the ROC began the reconstruction and development of 
Taiwan after the island was retroceded to China in  1945. Economic difficulties 
abounded, and there was rampant inflation, budgetary deficits, trade deficits, 
a shortage of foreign exchange, a lack of  infrastructure, and low living stan- 
dards. To  deal with all these economic ills, the government adopted a host of 342  Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
policies,  among them high tariff barriers, quantitative import restrictions, ex- 
change controls, and currency overvaluation.  All these policies were highly 
fashionable then in certain circles of  the economic profession and were gen- 
erally labeled  as import-substitution  policies.  Government  officials believed 
that these policies not only could solve all the current economic problems but 
could also nurture the infant  industries  and bring  about economic  develop- 
ment. Thus, in the 1950s, high tariff rates and import controls were instituted 
to protect industries such as textiles, flour, sugar, plywood, plastics, cement, 
and paper that the government wanted to develop. Import restrictions and high 
tariffs were also imposed on luxury goods to save foreign exchange. 
This import-substitution  policy did have the effect of promoting domestic 
production, but the home market was soon saturated. By 1959, capacity utili- 
zation rates in a broad spectrum of industries had fallen to very low levels. 
From 1958 to 1961, a series of measures such as currency devaluation, provi- 
sion of export incentives, establishment of tax-free export-processing  zones, 
etc. were adopted to promote exports. In fact, the export expansion strategy 
can be said to have begun in July  1955, when provisions were made for the 
rebate of  import duty, the defense surtax, and the commodity tax in order to 
encourage the processing of imported materials for export. 
Despite  the  export-promotion strategy,  import  substitution  as a key  eco- 
nomic policy was not discontinued. Import controls and protective tariff rates 
remained  in effect.  Some products, such as textiles  and certain  agricultural 
products, which had already grown to be the main sources of exports, contin- 
ued to be protected. 
High tariffs, coupled with controls on nearly half the import items, success- 
fully suppressed imports during the course of export expansion. Under the 
pegged exchange rate, a trade surplus began to develop and grow. The surplus 
amounted to U.S. $105 million in  1970 and U.S. $766 million in 1973. The 
successive trade surpluses forced the Central Bank to neutralize the exchange 
market by injecting a flood of new money. The surging money supply threat- 
ened price stability and forced the government to switch policies. Bold import 
liberalization  measures were  undertaken  in  1972 and  1974. The measures 
brought the controlled and prohibited import items to less than 3 percent, and 
that proportion stayed virtually unchanged until the mid-l980s, when a trade 
surplus reemerged and grew to a very high proportion of GNP. 
More extensive import liberalization and deeper tariff cuts were undertaken 
in the  1980s owing to political pressure from the U.S. government as well as 
swelling  trade  surpluses. The United  States has been  Taiwan’s major trade 
partner,  and the ballooning  trade  imbalance  in  Taiwan’s favor  produced  a 
strong American demand that Taiwan open its domestic market. As a result, 
tariff concessions were successively  made, and nontariff trade barriers were 
removed one after another. In fact, since 1980, the ROC government has been 
forced to revise its tariff schedule virtually every year. 343  Political Economy of  Trade Protection in Taiwan 
12.2  Empirical Models of nade  Protection 
In his survey of the literature regarding the political economy of tariff pro- 
tection, Baldwin noted the “widespread disagreement as to which of the vari- 
ous competing hypotheses best explains the structure of protection within in- 
dustrial democracies”  (Baldwin  1984, 573). The disagreement may be even 
more widespread  when we come to discuss a developing  country lying be- 
tween democracy and dictatorship.  Nevertheless,  in our empirical modeling 
of Taiwan’s trade protection,  we shall examine two models to see their rele- 
vance for the analysis of Taiwan’s tariff and nontariff protection measures. 
The first model is the interest group model. This model views the govern- 
ment as “intermediates who balance the conflicting interest of various groups 
in society in order to maximize their likelihood of remaining in power” (Bald- 
win 1984, 573). In a democratic society, these interest groups are tied to vot- 
ing power or campaign  effectiveness,  which eventually  decide the election 
outcome. In that  scenario,  political decisions depend on the preferences of 
voters and interest groups, with the state having little independent influence. 
This view is exemplified in Olson (1965) and Brock and Magee (1978). 
The second model, the national interest model, holds the opposite point of 
view. It views the state as an autonomous decision maker, formulating policies 
in line with the “national interest.” National interest may cover broad areas of 
concern,  such  as national  security,  price  stability, rapid  economic  growth, 
equity, national prestige, etc. The model seems to be a natural portrait of  an 
authoritarian regime.  It is also called the “bureaucratic authoritarian” model 
by  Findlay  and Wellisz  (1982). The difference  between  the two models is 
obvious,  and they represent two contrasting styles of  policy-making.  In the 
interest group model, the government responds to the demands of the pressure 
groups with the sensitivity of responses in line with the group’s political lev- 
erage. In essence, the structure of tariffs is set in a political  “market” where 
equilibrium is reached when demand for protection matches the state’s will- 
ingness to supply it. In contrast, in the national  interest model, the govern- 
ment behaves according to certain “principles” that it applies irrespective of 
the amount of pressure (Lavergne 1983, 3). 
In  the  real  world,  both  models  may  find  a  certain  explanatory  power. 
Hence, they are not mutually exclusive. Even in an apparent “autonomous” 
state like Taiwan, pressure groups may find ways and means to influence po- 
litical  decisions.  In order to consolidate its power base,  the state used eco- 
nomic interests to glue together its loyalists (Chu 1989). This includes Main- 
land  entrepreneurs  who  made  the  exodus  to  Taiwan  with  the  Nationalist 
government,  local business conglomerates that maintain an intimate relation 
with the party, etc. In an autonomous regime, these favored constituents may 
act as de facto pressure groups. 
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models when  applied to Taiwan’s structure of trade protection  in  1981 and 
1986, the most recent years for which input-output tables provide the neces- 
sary data. In the 1980s, the state’s degree of  autonomy had been considerably 
lessened from previous years, and democratic elements had begun to emerge 
in society. The ruling KMT party started to face real challenges from indepen- 
dent politicians in elections; political pluralism  was taking shape, climaxing 
in the formation of an opposition party in  1986. Taiwan also emerged as one 
of  the world’s major trading countries in the  1980s, and surging trade sur- 
pluses made it susceptible to international protectionism. In sum, the autono- 
mous  state gradually  dissolved  in the  1980s, and we expect the patterns  of 
protection  in  1981 and  1986 to reveal  some of  the changes in the political 
arena. 
We shall examine the protection structure in terms of both tariff and nontar- 
iff barriers. The nontariff barriers are presumably the protection measures fa- 
vored by the executive branch of the government for they afford the bureau- 
crats  more  discretionary  power.  While  any revision  of  the  tariff  schedule, 
including reclassification  of import items among permissible, controlled, and 
prohibited  categories, must be approved by the legislative branch, the impo- 
sition of  the  aforementioned  administrative restrictions  on permissible  im- 
ports was in the power of the executive branch. 
How to measure the degree of  protection  provided by nontariff barriers is 
an unresolved  issue. Various indexes have been proposed in the literature. In 
this paper, in addition to adopting an aggregated index, we shall also employ 
a disaggregated measurement for analysis. First,  according to the classifica- 
tion in Taiwan’s tariff schedule, all import items fit into one of the following 
six nontariff barrier  (NTB) categories  in  accordance with  its administrative 
regulations, or lack thereof 
1. Controlled or prohibited (denoted NTB 1); 
2.  Facing a producer-only import restriction (denoted NTB2); 
3. Facing a public-enterprise-only import restriction (denoted NTB3); 
4.  Facing a sources-of-import restriction (denoted NTB4); 
5. Facing a special-agency-licensing restriction (denoted NTBS); 
6.  Freely importable (denoted NTB6). 
The objects of our study are the four-digit industry sectors laid out in the 
input-output tables, each sector containing a number of seven-digit tariff items 
defined  in the Customs Import Tariff  (Schedule) of the Republic of  China. 
Each item fits into one of the above NTB categories,  and the distribution of 
these items is a fair representation of the structure of protection in each indus- 
try sector. Dividing the number of  import items in each category by the total 
number of import items in the whole industry, we obtain a percentage distri- 
bution  across six NTB categories, with the percentages always summing to 
unity. Our task is to see how the above-stated models explain this distribution, 
which is a disaggregated representation of trade protection. 345  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
Note that analyzing the fraction of the industry subject to each kind of pro- 
tection differs from the traditional probit-model  approach to the analysis of 
nontariff barriers. While the probit model classifies each industry as protected 
or nonprotected, our approach looks beyond the yes-or-no question by exam- 
ining the methods of protection. Through joint estimation of the distribution 
of import controls, we will understand not only how the relevant explanatory 
variables affect the existence of nontariff barriers but also how these variables 
determine the composition of barriers. The approach is analogous to the share 
equation analysis of the choice of inputs. 
In the second step, we will follow the traditional approach in formulating 
an aggregate index to represent nontariff barriers.  The index will then enter 
the two models along with the tariff  in a simultaneous-equations  setting to 
examine their goodness of fit. In doing so, we basically view nontariff mea- 
sures and tariffs as two policy options open simultaneously to policymakers. 
The choices may be made simultaneously as the policymakers choose the pol- 
icy mix that minimizes the cost of protection, or maximizes their likelihood 
of remaining in power, or fits into whatever objective function they may ad- 
here to. The choices may also be made sequentially, as in Ray (1981), where 
U.  S. policymakers were depicted as choosing tariffs first and complementing 
them with nontariff protection measures when necessary. 
We largely follow Chang (1986) in choosing the explanatory variables. The 
interest group model comprises the following explanatory variables: 
CR4:  Four-firm  concentration ratio.  It measures  the market  power of  the 
dominant firms. The public choice theory predicts that the firms in an 
oligopolistic industry have a lower cost in exercising  their political 
influence and hence are more effective in obtaining protection. 
DPAR: Dummy variable for KMT party-affiliated  industries. DPAR takes the 
DPE: 
DFDI: 
value of  1 for the industry where one or more KMT party-affiliated 
firms exist and they are also among the top 500 firms in the China 
Credit Information Service (CCIS) annual survey. It takes the value of 
0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for public enterprises. DPE takes the value of  1 for 
the industry  where one or more public enterprises exist and they are 
also among the top 500 firms in the CCIS annual survey. It takes the 
value of 0 otherwise. 
Dummy variable for foreign direct investment. DFDI takes the value 
of 1 for the industry where one or more foreign-owned firms exist and 
they are also among the top 500 firms in the CCIS annual survey. It 
takes the value of 0 otherwise. 
The four variables are designed to capture the influences of  party-affiliated 
enterprises (by DPAR), public enterprises (by DPE), and local private enter- 
prises (by CR4, which includes the effects of others). Labor unions are con- 
spicuously  missing  as an explanatory variable,  for, until  15 July  1987, the 346  Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
right to strike was suspended, and labor unions were little more than organiz- 
ers of employees’ pastime activities. 








Labor intensity, measured by the ratio of labor input to capital input 
in each sector. Both include the direct inputs as well as the indirect 
inputs embodied in intermediate goods. The variable is designed to 
see whether the protection favors labor or capital. 
Producer-goods  ratio, measured by  the proportion of  imports used 
by producers as raw materials, intermediate goods, or capital goods. 
In other words, it is the proportion of the sector’s imports designated 
for industrial  usage, as opposed to consumption.  It  is typical  in a 
developing  country  that  producer  goods are given preference over 
consumer goods to be imported. 
Import-penetration  ratio, measured by  the ratio of imports to total 
demand  in each  sector.  It indicates the market  share taken  by  im- 
ports.  A  higher  import-penetration  ratio  alerts  the  government  to 
award more protection to the endangered industry if the government 
is protectionist  oriented.  In this case, there exists a positive corre- 
lation between the import-penetration ratio and the degree of protec- 
tion. If  the government  is apathetic to the industry  threatened by 
imports,  a  higher  import-penetration  ratio  may  simply  reflect  the 
result of  slack protection. In this case, the correlation is negative. 
Export share, measured by the ratio of  exports to the value of pro- 
duction. The export share normally indicates its international com- 
petitiveness. We expect a higher EXSH to be correlated with a lower 
level of protection. 
Import-concentration ratio, measured by the ratio of imports in each 
sector to total imports. It indicates the extent to which the sectoral 
imports  drain  foreign exchange. This variable  matters  particularly 
when the government is concerned with its foreign exchange posi- 
tion. 
Dummy variable  for key  sector. This variable takes the value of  1 
for the industry that is designated as a strategic mining or manufac- 
turing industry  under the Statute for the Encouragement of Invest- 
ment, the law that regulates  investment  promotion.  If the govern- 
ment  resorts  to tariff  or  nontariff  barriers  to  protect  the  strategic 
industry, we should expect a positive correlation between DKEY and 
the degree of protection. 
Public enterprises’ share in output, measured by the ratio of the out- 
put of  public enterprises  to the output of the whole industry. It at- 
tempts to capture the possible trade preferences given to public en- 
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DAGR:  Dummy variable for the agricultural sector. This variable takes the 
value of  1 for the forestry, fishing, and farming sectors. It takes the 
value of 0 otherwise. 
12.3  Empirical Results 
The distribution  of  nontariff  barriers  (NTB) is estimated  first.  Since the 
percentage associated with each NTB category is interrelated, the disturbance 
term  associated  with each regression  equation may  also be intercorrelated, 
and we adopt the seemingly unrelated regression method to conduct the esti- 
mation.  Furthermore, since the six variables (NTB1-NTB6)  always sum to 
unity, their disturbance terms are indeed perfectly correlated. Hence, we drop 
one of  the variables  (NTB2) to  form a five-equation  model.  The estimation 
results for the interest group model are reported in tables 12.2-12.3  and those 
for the national interest model in tables 12.4-12.5. 
Then a K-class model is employed to jointly estimate the tariff and an ag- 
gregated index of nontariff barriers (NTB). The NTB index is formulated by 
a weighted average of nontariff protection measures, with controlled and pro- 
hibited items given a weight of  1, public-enterprise-only  and special-agency- 
licensing restrictions  given a weight of 0.75, sources-of-imports  restrictions 
given a weight of 0.5, producer-only restrictions given a weight of 0.25, and, 
finally, freely importable items given a weight of  0. The weighting scheme, 
albeit arbitrary, is’ assigned in accordance with the order of  the degree of re- 
striction imposed by each type of regulation. The estimation results from the 
Table 12.2  Interest Group Model of Nontariff Barriers, 1981 
NTB I  NTB3  NTB4  NTB5  NTB6 
Constant  ,0139 
CR4  ,0004 




(I  .72) 
( .60) 
DPE  -  .0403* 
DFDI  -  .0152 














-  .0490* 
(1.85) 




N  = 280, weightedR’ = .0846 
~  ,0120 
(.95) 
,0003 
(I  .45) 
.0873** 
(4.70) 










-  .0963* 
(1.74) 
-  .0953 
(1.59) 
Note; NTB I  = controlled  or prohibited; NTB3  = facing a public-enterprise-only restriction; 
NTB4  = facing a sources-of-import restriction; NTB5  = facing a special-agency-licensing re- 
striction; NTB6 = free of restrictions. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 348  Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
Table 12.3  Interest Group Model of  Non-tariff Barriers, 1986 
NTB 1  NTB3  NTB4  NTBS  NTB6 
Constant  .03  17 
CR4  -  ,0002 
DPAR  -.0031 
DPE  .0431** 






-  .0362**  -  ,0037 
(2.43)  (.73) 
(3.05)  (1.68) 
-  ,0223  -  ,0020 
.1304**  ,0055 
,0043  ,0017 
.0007**  .0001* 
(1.33)  (.48) 
(8.40)  (1.42) 
(.34)  (.55) 
N  = 297, weighted R2 = . 
,0340  .9736** 
.oO09*  -  .0017** 
(1.05)  (24.4) 
(1.79)  (2.61) 
-  ,0297  ,0582 
(.81)  (1.29) 
(.46)  (4.26) 
(2.34)  (1.38) 
.0154  -  .1771** 
.0644**  -  ,0468 
1033 
Nore: See table 12.2. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 12.4  National Interest Model of Nontariff lkade Barriers, 1981 












-  .0001 
(.07) 
-  ,0214 
(.88) 
-  ,0119 
(.38) 
-  .0444 
(I  .58) 
-  ,1469 
(.30) 
~  ,0239 
(1.28) 
-  ,041  1 
(1.36) 
-  .0365* 
(1.69) 
.1390**  .0848*  *  .0418** 
(3.48)  (2.57)  (2.08) 
~  ,0018  .oO08  .0016 
(.58)  (.32)  (1.02) 
-.1162**  -.0361  .0475** 
(2.97)  (1.12)  (2.41) 
-  ,0556  -  ,0471  .0534** 
(1.11)  (1.14)  (2.12) 
-.1719**  -  ,0066  -  .0588** 
(3.82)  (2.60) 
3.3498**  ,1954  -.I378 
(4.30)  (.30)  (.a) 
-  .0740**  -  .0415**  -  ,0099 
(2.46)  (1.67)  (.65) 
.4999**  -  ,0582  -  ,0191 
(10.33)  (1.46)  (.78) 
(.39)  (1.35)  (1.84) 
N  = 336, weighted R2 = .1123 















.0928*  * 
-  .4101** 
,0414 
Noie: See table 12.2. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 349  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
Table 12.5  National Interest Model of Nontariff ’lkade Barriers, 1986 
















-  ,0477 
(I  .58) 









-  ,0084 
.0697** 
(3.73) 
-  ,0012 
(.  79) 
-  .0688** 
(3.80) 
-  ,0287 
(1.26) 




-  ,0193 
(1.17) 
(1  1.23) 





-  .0020** 
(2.43) 
-  .0453** 
(4.46) 
-  .0028 
-  .0207* 
(1.80) 
,1638 
-  ,0065 
~40) 
~71) 
-  .0128 
(1.04) 













-  ,0249 
(.61) 
-  ,0559 
(1.02) 
(7.70) 
.2988*  * 
.9452*  * 
(31.24) 









-  .0868** 
.0636* 
(.48) 
-  .1507** 
(4.23) 
(4.17) 
-  .1050** 
N  = 372, weighted R2  = ,1743 
Note: See table 12.2. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
interest group model are reported in tables 12.6-12.7 and those from the na- 
tional interest model in tables 12.8-12.9. 
It appears that the national interest model explains the structure of protec- 
tion better than the interest group model, especially when tariff  and nontariff 
measures are jointly considered. In the determination of nontariff barriers, the 
effect of explanatory variables pertaining to the interest group model is spo- 
radic.  Only the  four-firm concentration ratio  (CR4)  and  public  enterprise 
dummy (DPE) show a consistent effect on distribution. A higher concentra- 
tion ratio is shown to reduce the sector’s likelihood of being categorized as 
freely importable (shown by a smaller percentage for NTB6) and to increase 
its likelihood of being subject to the public-enterprise-only import constraint. 
Presumably, the more oligopolistic sectors are also dominated by public enter- 
prises. In 1986, a high concentration ratio also leads to sources-of-import and 
special-agency-licensing constraints. 
However, it  is the public enterprises that indicate the strongest effect on 
NTB  protection, judged by  its highest significant coefficient estimates. The 
existence of  major public enterprises reduces the sector’s chance to conduct 
free trade and increases its chance of being classified as controlled or prohib- 
ited or of being subject to public-enterprise-only and sources-of-import con- 350  Tain-  Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
Table 12.6  Interest Group Model of Protection, 1981 (K-class  Estimates, K  = .7) 
NTB  TF 




TFINTB  .0003 
CR4  .0019** 
DPAR  -  ,0130 
~30) 
DPE  ,0574 
(1.25) 
DFDI  ,0285 












-  ,488 
,098  I 
Note: NTB = nontariff barrier index; TF = tariff rate. 
*Significant at the 10  percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
Table 12.7  Interest Group Model of Protection, 1986 (K-class  estimates, K = .7) 
NTB  TF 
Constant  .0229 
TF/NTB  .0003 
CR4  ,001  I** 







DPE  .1415** 
DFDI  .0305 




(.  15) 




-  ,742 
(.32) 
-  ,363 
(.21) 
-  ,0017 
~  __ 
Note: See table 12 6 
*Significant at the 10 percent level 
**Significant at the 5 percent level 
straints (the latter for 1981 only). In addition, the presence of  multinational 
enterprises is shown to invite the sources-of-import constraint in 198  1 and the 
special-agency-licensing  constraint  in  1986. The presence  of  major party- 
affiliated enterprises is  shown to increase the likelihood of  special-agency- 
licensing and sources-of-import restriction in  198  1, but this influence disap- 
peared in  1986. It suggests that KMT enterprises’ ability to manipulate the 351  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
Table 12.8  National Interest Model of Protection, 1981 (K-class estimates, 
K  = .7) 














-  ,0012 
(.89) 
-  ,0015 
(.36) 
-  .2108** 
(3.63) 
(3) 
-  ,0116 
-  .2128** 
(3.85) 
2.0595**  - 
(2.30) 









-  7.191 
(.89) 
-  .515 
(1.64) 












-  2.506 
(.75) 
,2190 
Note: See table 12.6. 
*Significant at the  10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
licensing  scheme and to divert the source of  imports  in favor of  particular 
suppliers  (e.g., the  United  States)  had  subsided  by  1986. Except  for the 
switching preference in the forms of  protection by major multinational firms, 
for which no obvious explanation  is at hand, the results are largely in con- 
formity with a priori expectations. 
As for the national interest model, virtually all explanatory variables exert 
some influence over NTB distributions. Producer goods are shown to be fa- 
vored  by  free import. A  higher  RMK  is shown to reduce the likelihood of 
public-enterprise-only restrictions and special-agency licensing, and it reflects 
the government’s proindustry policy. A higher EXSH exerts exactly the same 
influence,  indicating  the  government’s proexport stance.  The estimates  for 
DKEY are rather counterintuitive,  however.  We  would  normally expect the 
government to protect the strategic sectors, which are often synonymous with 
infant industries.  The key to this puzzle lies in the fact that Taiwan’s concept 
of strategic industries is an unconventional  one. It views the industries with 
good export potential as strategic, and the protection of  such industries does 
not  require  import control  measures  for there  is little domestic  market  for 352  Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
Table 12.9  National Interest Model of Protection, 1986 (K-class estimates, 
K=  .7) 














-  ,0017 
,0021 
-  .2490** 
(4.13) 
-  .00002 
(.OO) 














(  14.90) 








-  21.020 
(.22) 





(I  .07) 
~92) 
-  8.566** 
,3856 
Note: See table 12.6. 
*Significant at the 10 percent level. 
**Significant at the 5 percent level. 
them.  Instead, the government resorts to other fiscal incentives, such as tax 
reduction,  interest subsidies,  and duty-free import of  machinery and equip- 
ment, to assist the industries. 
Public enterprises, again, exert a consistent and powerful effect on protec- 
tion. Their market share is positively correlated with the likelihood that they 
receive protection in the form of the exclusive right to import (NTB3). The 
import-concentration  ratio (CRIM) also shows a consistent effect on protec- 
tion. A higher ratio reduces the likelihood of free trade in favor of state-only 
import restriction. It suggests a government attempt to put itself in firm con- 
trol of the “essential” import items. Meanwhile,  a higher import-penetration 
ratio (IP) increases the likelihood of  special-agency licensing. But licensing 
seems to be a substitute for other forms of  protection  without reducing the 
proportion of freely importable items. Perhaps the government believes that 
licensing is more effective in curtailing imports when foreign products  have 
made deep inroads  into the  domestic market.  IP is shown to be  positively 
associated with the proportion of free import in 1986. This correlation seems 
to indicate a causation running from protection to market share; that is, a freer 
import arrangement leads to a higher degree of import penetration. It suggests 353  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
that the government became apathetic to import competition in 1986. The 
agricultural sector (DAGR) shows a conflicting effect on protection. It shows 
a negative effect on the likelihood of special-agency licensing (NTB5) in 198  1 
and a positive effect on the same variable in 1986. This reflects the fact that 
the import liberalization measures undertaken  in  1981-86  were mainly di- 
rected toward  the industrial sector, leaving the agricultural sector relatively 
more protected as a result. The related evidence is that DAGR exerts a nega- 
tive influence on the proportion of free import in 1986 but not in  1981. 
Now let us turn to the joint estimation of tariffs and nontariff barriers by the 
K-class method. It is obvious that the interest group model is outperformed by 
the national interest model, judging by the adjusted R2,  especially for the year 
1986. In the interest group model, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) and 
state enterprise dummy variable continued to show an influence on the overall 
measure of nontariff barriers to trade. The other variables ceased to produce 
significant coefficients, probably because aggregation conceals some micro 
effects  on individual NTB measures. 
On the tariff side, the estimation results indicate the inadequacy of the in- 
terest group model. In  1981, the four-firm concentration ratio (CR4) has a 
positive effect on tariff  rates, a result in  conformity with our prior expecta- 
tions. What seems surprising is that both  Party-affiliated and public enter- 
prises (DPAR and DPE) show a strong and negative effect on tariff  rates. It 
indicates that these politically influential groups resort to specific forms of 
nontariff measures to protect themselves, thereby earning themselves exclu- 
sive rights to import and making their imports subject to a lower rate of tariff. 
Thus, the lower tariffs actually enhance the degree of protection for these en- 
terprises, rather than lowering it. In 1986, the four-firm concentration ratio 
(CR4) and public-enterprise dummy variable (DPE) again show positive ef- 
fects on the nontariff barriers index. But the interest group model as a whole 
performs poorly in explaining the tariff  structure, with the adjusted R2  taking 
a negative value. The only slightly significant coefficient appears in front of 
CR4, with the sign contradictory to the theory. It may simply indicate that the 
model totally falls apart in explaining tariff protection. 
On the other hand, the national interest model performs well in both years. 
The effects of  the producer-goods ratio, export share, import-concentration 
ratio, key-industry consideration, and public enterprises on the overall index 
of NTB are largely in conformity with their effects on free import proportions 
(NTB6) shown in tables 12.4 and  12.5. A notable difference between  1981 
and 1986 can be observed for the agriculture dummy (DAGR), where DAGR 
is shown to have a negative effect on NTB in  1981 and a positive effect in 
1986. 
The structure of tariffs is also well explained by the national interest model. 
In both years, the producer-goods ratio (RMK) shows the strongest effect on 
tariffs, indicating that tariffs were designed to favor imports of raw materials, 
intermediate goods, and capital goods for industrial production. Note that it is 354  Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming Hou 
also the most powerful variable in explaining the NTB scheme. Strategic in- 
dustries (DKEY) were also shown to be favored by  low tariffs in addition to 
low NTBs. Public enterprises’ market share in the industry is positively cor- 
related  with  nontariff  protection  in  addition  to tariff  protection  in  1986. A 
higher import-penetration  ratio is correlated with a lower tariff rate in  1986, 
indicating  that  lower  tariffs  are favorable  for the performance  of  imported 
goods and that protectionist  measures to curtail import penetration were ap- 
parently lacking. Meanwhile, high import-concentration  ratios were likely to 
be associated with low tariffs (at least in 1981), but they were usually accom- 
panied by nontariff barriers. 
In both models, tariff and nontariff barriers show little correlation. The de- 
cisions made on them seem to be independent of  each other. There is no evi- 
dence indicating that the policy tools have been viewed either as substitutes or 
as complements in protecting domestic industries. 
12.4  Concluding Remarks 
This paper  has adopted  an  interest  group model  and  a  national  interest 
model to explore the determinants of  Taiwan’s tariff and nontariff barriers.  In 
general, the national interest model has outperformed the interest group model 
in  its portrait  of  Taiwan’s structure  of  protection,  especially  in the area of 
tariffs.  The results  support the thesis  that  Taiwan has been  an autonomous 
state in the formulation of trade policies. Even in the second half of the 1980s, 
when  a  democratic society  gradually  took  shape,  the  state’s  autonomous 
power did not appear to subside. 
The structure of protection closely reflects the state’s proindustry, proexport 
development strategy. Raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital equip- 
ment were consistently  favorable imports. On the other hand, labor benefits 
from neither  tariff  protection  nor nontariff  barriers.  Instead, labor’s rapidly 
rising income has been mainly derived from the rapidly growing export sec- 
tors, which are relatively labor intensive. The results also show that Taiwan 
did not resort to trade protection as a measure to boost “strategic industries.” 
On the contrary, the strategic industries were likely to be the low-tariff indus- 
tries. The government opted for fiscal incentives to nourish these industries. 
The most powerful interest group, in the determination of tariff and nontar- 
iff  barriers, was that of public  enterprises.  They often benefited  from being 
the sole importers of  the goods that were directly substitutable for their own 
products or could be used to produce such substitutes. The active role played 
by  public enterprises in production  as well as trade indicates that Taiwan is 
not entirely a capitalist state. Before privatization takes hold, it is likely that 
only external pressure can force a trade liberalization that would strip the pub- 
lic enterprises of their vested interests. 
In retrospect, it is not hard to understand why the national interest model 355  Political Economy of Trade Protection in Taiwan 
explains Taiwan’s tariff protection better than the interest group model. Until 
recently, government economic policy was dictated by a small group of gov- 
ernment officials under the leadership of  the late presidents Chiang Kai-Shek 
and Chiang Ching-Kuo. These officials were largely engineers by training, 
arriving in Taiwan from the Mainland without personal wealth and without 
connections to local business groups. The political environment was such that 
they could pursue virtually whatever policy they wanted as long as such poli- 
cies had the backing of  the top leadership. They did not have to bow to pres- 
sure from vested interest groups. 
Nonetheless, in view of the emerging political pluralism  and the visible 
U.S. pressure in the  1980s, we have expected, a priori,  an increase in the 
receptiveness of the state to pressure groups during the 1980s. But the protec- 
tion  structure fails to reveal  any significant policy shift between  1980 and 
1986. Instead, national interest concerns still seemed to prevail.  Perhaps we 
need to wait a few more years to witness the change. In a sense, the slowness 
of change also reflected the resistance from the vested interest groups that had 
been protected  in the name of  national  interest,  such as state-owned enter- 
prises. 
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Comment  Kenneth Flamm 
This is a very  interesting  paper.  It documents some extraordinary  shifts in 
trade policy and attempts to explain them in terms of a “political economy” 
framework that has increasingly been used to address questions of this sort. 
My background  in this particular  framework is nil, and for this reason I am 
going to squeeze their exposition into the more conventional microeconomic 
framework of  supply and demand that I am accustomed to using in analyzing 
markets. In this case, the market is for a rather unconventional  commodity 
called “protection .” 
I will address three issues. First, what exactly are the authors estimating? 
My somewhat critical comments on this question probably apply to much of 
the work in this area, including other papers presented at this conference, so 
they should not be interpreted as a specific indictment of their work but rather 
as a more general set of  questions about all work  adopting this framework. 
There may be little that they can do to fix some of  the specification problems 
that  trouble  me. Second, I  will  make some specific  comments about  their 
econometrics, focusing on estimation issues. Third, I want to raise some flags 
about testing and inference questions. 
To begin, when we talk about a market, even one as ill defined as the one 
for “protection,” my first impulse is to draw supply and demand curves. The 
quantity axis of my diagram should clearly specify units of “protection.” After 
some thought, I decided that one reasonable choice for the “price” axis would 
be “net price” to the politicians or bureaucrats of  protection,  that is, votes or 
payoffs or whatever, net of the political costs of the inefficiency that protection 
created. The demand curve naturally  slopes downward, and, ceteribus pari- 
bus, I would expect it to be shifted by the efficiency or competitiveness of the 
sector; more efficient sectors should value protection less than inefficient sec- 
tors. 
I would expect the supply curve to slope upward or perhaps be vertical- 
if, for example, national interest places value on a sector that is insensitive to 
economic considerations. My diagram refers to a single sector. Multisectoral 
data allow one to estimate the location of some “generic” supply curve as it is 
shifted by industry-specific factors. 
Chen and Hou identify two theories of  the supply side: one, the “interest 
group” theory,  discusses relative changes in supply in terms of factors that 
make it easier for interest groups to act on the state. Thus, for example, a 
more concentrated industry, or an industry associated with a powerful political 
party,  might  face a greater supply of  protection  for given price.  They also 
identify a “national interest” theory of  supply (which one might also call the 
“autonomous  state” theory), which argues that visionary-or  stubborn-bu- 
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reaucrats supply protection based on criteria that are independent of the blan- 
dishments, or the ability to supply blandishments, of the industry in question. 
To my way of thinking, this supply curve should probably rise vertically. They 
see it shifted by such factors as labor intensity, orientation toward production 
(rather than consumption) goods, and import penetration. 
Now,  in general, we will observe actual industry  outcomes generated  by 
shifts in both supply and demand, and we have to ask whether we can identify 
supply or demand. Unfortunately, it seems to me that the factors identified as 
shifting supply under the “national interest” hypothesis also determine com- 
petitiveness and therefore shift the demand for protection; this raises the seri- 
ous question of whether we can identify this “supply curve” econometrically. 
One seeming way out would be to estimate a reduced-form  equation giving 
the equilibrium quantity of  protection,  rather than a structural equation, and 
test for hypotheses concerning the supply curve by means of exogenous vari- 
ables included in this reduced form. However,  if the demand curve contains 
the same exogenous variables as arguments, this approach still will not work. 
The interest group theory of  supply faces other problems.  Some of its de- 
terminants-notably  industry  concentration  and the presence of  foreign in- 
vestment-are  clearly  caused by,  as well  as possibly  causing, the  level  of 
protection.  Therefore, this requires the use of statistical models that provide 
for their endogeneity, which the authors, unfortunately, do not use. 
Next, let me turn to estimation issues. The authors use a seemingly unre- 
lated regression  model  to estimate the supply of different types of  nontariff 
barriers. Why not also include tariff levels in this system? Also, as previously 
mentioned, some of their explanatory variables are almost certainly endoge- 
nous. 
For some unspecified reason, the authors decide to use a K-class estimator 
for an alternative model, which includes equations explaining both tariff and 
aggregate nontariff barriers. For even less clear reasons, they choose a value 
of K  = .7, which guarantees that their coefficient estimates are inconsistent. 
Why not simply use two-stage least squares (i-e.,  K  = l)?  The only justifica- 
tion for such another choice of K (other than the root of a determinantal equa- 
tion, which gives the limited information maximum likelihood estimator) that 
I can think of would revolve around possible small sample characteristics of 
the distribution  of the estimator,  and I see no such justification  given here. 
Also,  since the K-class  estimator is  a limited  information  estimation  tech- 
nique, I surmise that they are “stacking” the two equations and not attempting 
to estimate cross-equation covariances. Thus, the only sense in which they are 
using a “joint” estimation technique is that they presume identical variances 
for the disturbance terms in each of  the two equations. Some discussion of 
their variables and equation structure justifying the techniques they have cho- 
sen to use would have been desirable. 
The last issue I must mention  is that of specification testing. With  seem- 
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estimated covariance matrix), R2  cannot be used as a test of goodness of fit for 
alternative  specifications.  In  fact,  the  only  context  in  which  R2 measures 
something that is directly and appropriately interpretable as a transformation 
of a meaningful specification statistic is for ordinary least squares, which they 
are not using. One way in which they might construct a meaningful specifica- 
tion test is to  include both sets of  variables,  then constrain  subsets to equal 
zero and calculate a Wald  statistic, which is easily done in most econometric 
packages. 
In conclusion, I would  offer the following  suggestions  for further  work. 
Estimate reduced-form equations, using all the exogenous variables discussed 
in this paper. Then constrain those associated with the “interest group” theory 
of supply to equal zerv and construct a Wald test for this hypothesis, which 
will allow you to accept or rejcct the interest group theory hypothesis. Unfor- 
tunately, you will not be able to use an analogous procedure with the “national 
interest” theory because the exogenous variables playing a potential role in 
supply may also be expected to affect the demand for protection. 
Comment  Ching-huei Chang 
This  is  an  interesting  and  stimulating  paper,  and  I enjoyed  reading  it very 
much. In this paper, Tain-Jy Chen and Chi-ming  Hou attempt to determine 
whether Taiwan’s tariff and nontariff trade policy can be better described by an 
interest group model or a national interest model. For that purpose, they for- 
mulate some aggregate and disaggregate indexes according to the degree of 
protection provided by nontariff barriers. These indexes and tariff levels are 
then fitted into several regression equations, using different explanatory vari- 
ables under different hypotheses, for the years  1981 and 1986. From the re- 
sults obtained, they  conclude: “In  general, the  national  interest  model  has 
outperformed the interest group model in its portrait of Taiwan’s structure of 
protection, especially in the area of tariffs.” 
I do not have any doubts about the adequacy of their estimation, and the 
conclusion they reach seems to me not surprising.  However, I would like to 
see some discussion about how the demand and supply of protection works to 
determine the levels and structure of tariffs and nontariff barriers. The political 
“market”  in Taiwan is markedly  different from that  in the United  States or 
other advanced nations. It is close to a monopolistic market, even after 1985, 
when the first opposition party was formed. Compared with the ruling KMT 
party, the major opposition party, the Democratic Progressive party (DPP), is 
quite weak in every aspect. Because administrators,  including the president, 
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the vice president, prime ministers, and a large proportion of parliamentary 
members, are not elected by citizens of the society, they do not have the inten- 
tion of  taking actions in line with the will or preference of  the people. Here 
we have a divergence between the government objective function and the so- 
cial welfare function (however it is defined), even though the decision makers 
may rationalize these actions in terms of national security, national prestige, 
or national  interest.  However, because there still exists a potential threat of 
competition  from the opposition party,  these  decision  makers  may  restrain 
their behaviors  in order not to lose market shares to DPP or other parties. 
Summing up, Taiwan  is  not  a democratic  country, nor  is  it  a dictatorship. 
Therefore, whether a national interest model or an interest group model can 
be applied to explain Taiwan’s protection policy is questionable. 
Another point should be made. There are interest groups existing in Taiwan 
that exercise their influence, not through lobbying or any other open actions 
found in advanced nations, but through under-the-table operations (like brib- 
ery or seeking a good connection with some power “elite”). For example, one 
of  the automobile companies used to be protected from foreign competition 
by tariff and nontariff barriers because its owner had close connections with 
the  late  President  Chiang Kai-shek. Finally,  there exists  pressure  from the 
United States and some other countries that may have some effect on the de- 
mand for, or supply of, protection. 
At any rate, we need a new theoretical model that fits into the framework 
of  Taiwan’s political  situation. This suggestion  may  be consistent  with  the 
results of Chen and Hou’s regression  analyses reported  in their tables  12.2- 
12.9. In most of  these regression  equations, adjusted RZ  is quite small, and 
the estimated  value of the constant term is significantly different from zero. 
Obviously, some important variables are missing in these equations. 